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Abstract
This  article  adopts  Complexity  Theory to  improve  understanding  of  Iraq's  future  patterns  of
democratic stabilization and consolidation. It emphasizes the importance of soft technologies, as
well as hard technologies for making better public policy choices. The article also  sheds light on
Iraq's  institutional  evolution,  on  its  processes  and mechanisms of  variation   and replication.  It
emphasizes the importance of new culturally-sensitive public policies and political economies. The
first part of the article briefly describes the main political, economic, social and cultural changes in
Iraq since the fall of the Saddam regime. The second part discusses the system of social security in
Iraq and in formerly ISIS controlled territories. The final section deals with important challenges of
de-radicalization  necessary  that  are  necessary  for  the   democratization,  liberalization,
institutionalization and consolidation of new institutions. A new spatial politics of public policy
making in formerly ISIS-occupied territories is also discussed in the concluding section.
Keywords:  Iraq,  ISIS,  Complexity  Theory,  Soft  Technologies,  Hard  Technologies,  Political
Economy
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Introduction
This article adopts Complexity Theory, as discussed by Room and colleagues, in order to improve
understanding of Iraq's future patterns of democratic stabilization and consolidation. The article
emphasizes the importance of soft technologies, as well as of hard technologies for making better
public  policy choices (Room et al.  2017).  Soft  technologies include public policy and political
economy  methods, such as the choice of and the ways in which a determined  public policy and
political economy is implemented. Hard technologies involve, for example, the instruments, such as
the practical tools to implement these policies. In this perspective,  Complexity Theory  becomes a
useful  theoretical  account  to  address  ISIS's  nation-building  activities,  including  processes  of
economic, political, cultural and social change (Room et al. 2017).  Taking into account Parsons'
(1951) and Luhmann's (1984) definition, Iraq's social system can be described as made of different
sub-systems  –  eco-systems  -  with  associated internal  logics  -  pychological  and  institutional  -.
Improve understanding of the “co-evolution” of these complex ecosystems and the ways in which
individuals interact (Room 2016a) at the politics, polity and policy level is important for choosing
the right public policy instrumentation (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007), as well as for making Iraq
democracy work and more resilient (Diamond et el. 2016). 
In  Choice Architecture,   2017 Nobel Prize Winner Richard H. Thaler and his colleagues Cass R.
Sunstein,  John P.  Balz (2014) have defined the NUDGES approach, as comprising of six main
principles  for  making  good  policy  choices:  iNcentives,  Understand  mappings,  Defaults,  Give
feedback, Expect error, and Structure complex choices. 
iNcentives refers  to  prices  and incentives.  More specifically,  it  has  to  do with:  who uses,  who
chooses,  who  pays,  who  profits  of  (and  by)  a  determined  policy  choice.  Understand
mappings concerns the right policy choices that lead to the welfare of society. This, for example,
involves  selecting  which  policies  to  choose  among a  wide variety of  possible  equally suitable
alternatives.  Defaults means  avoiding  the  least  pathway  of  resistance  when  this  default  option
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(doing nothing or no change) leads to negative results  (Thaler et  al.  2014, p.  430). In complex
systems, Give feedback is  a  necessary endeavor  to  avoid  mistakes.  For  instance,  what  rose the
admiration of baseball fans and gives them joy is often the individual achievements of players. But
the player there does not stand alone at the plate, because s/he is part of a team. Looks, throws,
catches,  hustles  are  all  elements  part  of  one  big  team1.  Giving  feedback  to  players  becomes,
inevitably,  necessary  to  ensure  the  consistency  of  their  game  choices.  Expect  error is  a  fifth
important element in order to improve a policy-maker’s choice architecture. If a player goes out
there for himself/herself without thinking about the team (or caring about the team), he or she gets
nowhere. The team must fit, players must expect errors and learn how to deal with them. Structure
complex choices is hence the sixth and final element of the NUDGES approach. It involves the
necessity of adopting different strategies for dealing with complex problems and choosing the best
alternative  with  more  trade-offs.  Structure  complex  choices  means,  in  brief,  having in  mind a
structure of alternative suitable  strategies.  NUDGES include making the right  choice of  public
policy instruments and the methods associated to their implementation, such as the ways in which a
public policy instrument must be put in place (such as though through institutional adjustments or
evolutions) (Steinmo 2010).
In Behavioral Economics, Richard Thaler and Sendhil Mullainathan (2000) have further discussed
two important concepts in sociology and behavioral economics, as elucidated some time before
by Herbert Simon (1955): bounded rationality and bounded willpower. Bounded rationality refers to
the  bounded  rational  cognitive  processes  that  an  individual  faces  in  a  determined  institutional
setting. This includes also the ways in which they deal with the Descartes’ Error (Damasio 1994) –
that is to say – the tensions that exist between their emotions and ir/rational behaviors. In other
words, their Feeling of What Happens (Damasio 2000). Bounded willpower concerns, instead, the
desires’ contraints that actors face in their everyday life, especially when socialized in determined
institutions.  As  Thaler  and Mullainathan  (2000) have  rightly emphasized,  departures  from pre-
1 Metaphor from the movie “The Untouchables” by Brian De Palma.
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existing  ir/rationalities  are  not  rare  (on  path-departures,  see  also  Cerami  and  Vanhuysse  2009;
Cerami 2013).  It  is,  in fact,  often not uncommon to adopt “the rule of the thumb as a way to
economize on cognitive faculties” (Thaler and Mullainathan (2000 p.3; see Room 2016b, pp.1-9). 
In a  recent  attempt to  improve Thaler's  et  al's  NUDGES approach,  Room and colleagues  have
highlighted the necessity to shifting “the focus from individual psychology to political economy”
(Room 2016, p. 9). They suggest to better capture not only the “citizens' formal organizations -
political, commercial, educational”, but also their “more informal communities – religious, cultural,
residential” (Room 2006b, p.6), around which, for example, Iraqis build their identities. Hence, as a
multi-dimensional eco-system, ISIS must be investigated taking into full consideration its political,
economic,  social  and  cultural  evolution.  As  Steinmo  (2010)  and  Lewis  and  Steinmo  (2012)
highlight, institutions, organizations (including criminal or terrorist) and individuals evolve through
gradual  institutional  changes.  Also,  they  do  so  by  “generating  new  variation  upon  which
mechanisms of selection and replication” take place (Lewis and Steinmo 2012, p. 314). 
This article sheds light on the processes and mechanisms of variation, selection and replication,
emphasizing the importance of new culturally-sensitive public policies and political  economies.
Here, public policies concern all those choices that aim at administering, managing and reducing
distributive and social  conflicts  (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 2016) through political  economy
instruments. And, hence, they contribute to the reconstruction, stabilization and consolidation of
countries affected by war, disaster or, more generally, by state fragility. A particular attention to
human  security  (see  Burgess  et  al.  2007),  including  the  human  rights  dimension,  in  the  the
administration of policy choices remains vital. 
This article is structured as follows. Part I briefly describes the main political, economic, social and
cultural changes in Iraq since the fall of the Saddam regime. Part II discusses the system of social
security in Iraq and in formerly ISIS occupied territories. The final section  deals with important
challenges  of  de-radicalization  that  are  necessary  for  the  democratization,  liberalization,
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institutionalization and consolidation of new institutions. A new spatial politics of public policy
making in former ISIS-occupied territories is also discussed in the concluding section.
Political Changes in Iraq
Since the first Gulf War of 1980-1988, Iraq underwent a difficult transition to democracy which has
been characterized by the emergence of civil conflicts and system instability. The second Gulf War
in 1991, the international economic sanctions in 1991–2003, and the fall of the Saddam Hussein
regime in 2003 did not succeed to resolve the internal problems, but have often exacerbated pre-
existing  ethnic  and religious  tensions.  This  has  resulted  in  an increasing  number  of  casualties,
which, since 2003, have amounted to about 123,000 people (World Bank 2014, p. 4). However, the
real number of deaths is estimated to be much higher than the one reported by official statistics.
Similar considerations apply to the number of violent attacks which have dropped significantly
since the beginning of the conflict.
In 2014, Iraq had an estimated population of approximately 32 million inhabitants. About 75-80
percent Arabs, and the remaining 15-20 percent of Kurdish Turkoman and Assyrian origins. The
Kurdish minority lives for the most  part  in  northeastern Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government,
henceforth KRG). Islam is the official religion and accounts for almost 99 percent of the population.
Shia  Muslims  correspond  to  60-65  percent  of  the  total  population,  while  Sunni  Muslims  to
approximately 30-34 percent. The remaining population is made of Christians (about 1 percent),
Hindus, Buddhists, Jewish, and people not affiliated to the above mentioned religions (CIA World
Factbook 2016).
Electoral engineering (Sartori 1994) has been key for the Iraqi transition to democracy, whose main
goal has been to reduce the power of the Shiite-Kurdish majority, expanding the representation of
the Sunnis. The intended consequence, most clearly expressed in the Iraq Study Group report of
2006  and  in  the  18  benchmarks  of  2007,  was  to  speeding  up  the  de-baathification  process.
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Simultaneously,  it  limited the incentives for violence and sectarian conflict  (Haggard and Long
2007, p. 2).
In order to bring democracy back to the table after decades of authoritarian subjugation, attempts at
creating a more representative territorial structure have been made by national and international
authorities. A proportional system of electoral representation was introduced after the fall of the
Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. As a  consequence,  since the first  elections in  2005, several
different lists of independent candidates (almost 36 in the elections of 2014) have emerged. The first
free elections have been held in 2005 and have seen the victory of President Jalal Talabani and of
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (6 April 2005). Both have been re-elected in the polls of 20 May
2006.  Mr  Talabani,  of  Kurdish  origin,  represented,  for  the  first  phase  of  transition,  the  most
prominent figure of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Mr al-Maliki represented, instead, the leading
figure of the Shia leading coalition ‘State of Law’. In the elections of 2014, Mr al-Maliki was re-
elected as Prime Minister but was replaced in 2016 by a Shiite politician Haider al-Abadi2. Mr Fuad
Masum, also of Kurdish origins, became instead the new President (Al Jazeera 2014; Wikipedia
2015).
In the light of a persistent electoral fragmentation of the political spectrum, Haggard and Long
(2007, p. 3) have identified in the ‘engineer’s dilemma’ a critical situation for future stabilization
and consolidation attempts in Iraq. The ‘engineer’s dilemma’ refers, in this case, to a situation in
which the presumed institutional change aimed at enlarging the representation of the Sunni minority
has ended up in an unexpected increase of violence. Among the problems of political inclusion
associated with this failure in constitutional and electoral engineering (Sartori 1994; Goodin 1994),
as a public policy instrument, the authors mention ‘the fragmentation of the combatants, their weak
representation in the formal political process, and the presence of extremists and the associated
process of outbidding’ (Haggard and Long 2007,  p.  3).  The fiscal  and federal  structure,  which
2http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraqs-political-situation-dire-as-maliki-digs-
in/2014/08/11/1c70942a-213a-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story.htm
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continues to favor the two major allies (Shia and Kurds), also plays a dominant role in reducing the
prospects for peace and stability. Interestingly, always according to the authors (see Haggard and
Long 2007, p. 8), these problems of ‘engineering’ associated to political realignments (Haggard and
Kaufman 2008) have contributed to exacerbate the demands of radical nationalists to re-establish a
Sunni hegemony, and increasing the jihadists’ requests for an Islamic ‘caliphate’.
An additional  important  and  often  neglected  issue  of  the  Iraqis  political  system concerns  the
increasing autonomy of the Kurdistan National Assembly, which also thanks to the number of seats
(111) and the relative power of the Kurdish minority, makes it de facto an autonomous regional state
or, in other words, a ‘state within a state’ (UNPO 2013). This has clear repercussions not only for
Iraq’s future national unity and long-term stability, but also for future redistributive attempts. The
territorial distribution of natural resources in the contemporary federal structure continues to favor
existing winning coalitions, not avoiding the creation of insider-outsider divides. The limits of such
a constructed ‘consociational democracy’, aptly highlighted by Lijphardt (1999), have become in
this way more apparent (Haggard and Long 2007, p. 12). This can also be seen in the formulation of
the new constitution, which, adopted by a referendum on 15 October 2005 (amended in 2013), has
established a mixed legal system of civil and Islamic law, still subjected to multiple interpretations 3.
These political changes in Iraq, including the electoral changes, have altered the map of pre-existing
distributive conflicts (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 2016) with associated social tensions. This has
also implied a redefinition of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) cleavage structure (centre-periphery and
state-church relations) with subsequent voter realignments.  In terms of territorial restructuring, new
cleavages have emerged among actors in former ISIS, as well  as non-ISIS occupied territories,
including opposition within national  elites  versus  local-regional  opposition,  as  well  as  interest-
specific opposition versus ideological opposition (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Fig. 9.1).
3 According to the Arab Barometer for Iraq (2012, p.5), about 72 percent of respondents agree that
‘religious practices should be kept as a private matter and separated from public life’, 85 percent
that ‘religious leaders should not interfere in voters’ decisions’, whilst only 31 percent that ‘Islamic
law was appropriate for their country’.
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Economic Changes in Iraq
In 2003, as a result of the US intervention against the Saddam regime, real GDP growth collapsed
by 40 percent, increasing, from that time, at rate of 6-8 percent per year. This early trend witnessed
a drastic reduction during the economic crisis of 2008-9 and the drop in oil prices in 2009 and in
2014-2015.  The results  of  the  initial  fall  in  GDP growth,  which  followed  the  US intervention
against Saddam Hussein in 2003 can be explained by the amenities of war and the resulting civil
conflict, as well as by the associated collapse of oil production and exports. A situation of low oil
prices occurred in 2009 (set  approximately at 60 US$ per barrel)  and in 2015, creating serious
difficulties for policy-makers in financing social welfare and reconstruction programs. 
In 2012, the oil revenues of Iraq accounted to approximately 80-90 percent of total revenues, whilst
taxes amounted to only 2 percent (World Bank 2014, pp. 5-8). As Huntington (1991) has correctly
emphasized, this has posed serious problems in terms of democratization and system stability, as the
lower the level of taxation, the lower are the chances of citizens to ask for genuine representation.
In the words of  the author,  ‘no taxation without  representation’ and ‘no representation without
taxation’ is  possible (Huntington 1991, p.  65).  In absence of a clear involvement of citizens in
financing their  own democracy, electoral requests become easily a gift  of the political  elites to
‘their’ citizens (Diamond 2008).
Despite efforts at structural adjustments, the country remains in all its parts an oil-based economy
with well-known problems related to bureaucratic and political mismanagement. I described this:
oil-led state-captured capitalism with associated oil-led state-captured war-fare regime, though, in
former  ISIS-controlled  territories,  war  developments  turned  the  system into  an  Insurgent  ISIS-
captured capitalism with associated Insurgent ISIS-captured war-fare regime  (see Cerami 2018;
see also Cerami and Stubbs 2013).
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As Almukhtar (2015) explains, close to war-making activities, in Iraq, ISIS relies always more often
on the acquisition of state assets of captured cities, as well as on money coming from different
sources, redistributing them among the population to  acquire  legitimacy and support.  The main
sources of financing include: oil, natural gas, phosphate, cement, agriculture, revenue of criminal
origin, extortion; kidnap and ransom, antiquities trafficking and donations (CAT 2016).
In June 2014, ISIS’ estimated assets in Iraq corresponded to no less than $875 million. Its major
revenue sources in 2014 were given by extortion and taxation activities in the Iraqi territory, which
were estimated at $600 million. In addition, $500 million were, in fact, stolen from state-owned
banks, $100 million from oil whose barrels are sold at half the official price. $20 million were
raised by kidnapping ransoms (Almukhtar 2015). In 2015, ISIS expanded increasing its investments
in people, paying its 20,000-30,000 fighters between $350 and $1500 per month according to their
rank, skills and nationality (FATF 2015, pp. 29-30). 
Similar estimations made by Lister (2015) state that there were approximately 30,000 ISIS armed
members in early 2015, and about a half of these were foreigners of not Iraqi or Syrian origin. The
ISIS total assets, presumably including also other occupied territories outside Iraq, should have, in
reality,  corresponded  to  $2  billion,  with  an  annual  revenue of  $200  million  to  $300  million
(Waterbury 2015). In 2016, ISIS oil revenue are estimated to range from $250 million per year to
nearly $365 million per year, though these numbers have declined due to the airstrikes on tanks and
oil refineries (Rand 2017, p.8)4. 
More  recently, ISIS  money may also  come  from stealing  and redistributing  credit  cards, social
welfare benefits, small loans, scooters, or even selling organs of dead fighters (for more information
on such disgusting business, see also FATF 2017; May 2017). As in other countries, selling weapons
4 Up-to-date information on ISIS financing mechanisms, including wage salaries, is provided by
Jones et al. (2017).
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can also be used as a corruption mechanism (see Enough Project 2017). Counterterrorist financing
strategies can play here a crucial role5.
As a telling article by Shatz (2015) has powerfully demonstrated, the use of public employment has
had the unintended consequence of radicalization and terrorist reinforcement. Financing the terrorist
organization ISIS, an umbrella of previously Al-Qaeda linked groups but with a clearer political and
nation-building  project,  has,  for  example,  been  made  possible  by  government  subsidies  to
government  employees  who  live  in  former  ISIS-controlled  territories  (wilaya
or ‘protectorates’) (Khatib 2015). This money estimated in several hundred million US$, have not
only reinforced the local system of patronage and clientelistic relations. They have also provided
additional support for an involuntarily sponsored ISIS administrative local economy, reinforcing the
ISIS ‘clear, hold, build’ strategy (Khatib 2015). Financing ISIS has also meant taking the control of
oil  revenues and pipelines  and of the relative bureaucratic  redistributive apparatus  (Sanger  and
Davis 2014). This has resulted in the emergence of local ISIS mini-states with local administrative
governance  mechanisms,  banking  and  social  investment  policies.  As  Shatz  (2005,  p.  I)  has
powerfully described, this nation-building activity has contributed to create ‘hundreds of thousands
of refugees, behead or crucify scores, if not hundreds of people, murder thousands, create sex-slave
markets,  destroy irreplaceable archaeological and cultural  sites, steal property based on religious
affiliation or ethnicity of the owner, use and train child soldiers and otherwise make life miserable
for millions of people’. This has also implied the creation of its own ISIS currency (Milliken 2015).
As a result  of these economic changes, new forms of cooptation,  as well as of acquisition and
redistribution of resources have emerged. Co-optation – broadly understood as the capacity of the
ruling elite to bind strategic actors via formal and informal institutions (Merkel and Gerschewski
5 On methods of financing and counterterrorist  financing strategies  in  Sub-Saharan Africa,  see
Cerami,  A.  (2015)  https://alfiocerami.wordpress.com/2015/12/07/counterterrorist-financing-
strategies-the-case-of-sub-saharan-africa/. 
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2011,  p.1)  has  now  shifted  toward  ISIS-leaders  as  new  co-opters,  who  aim  at  substituting
democratic participation by ensuring the inclusion of strategically important radical parts  of the
population into politics and the economy. How will the legal bureacracy of President Fuad Masum
and of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's  government deal with these emerging societal problems?
Will they succeed to defeat the illegal and terrorist ISIS-bureaucracy?
Social Change in Iraq
As discussed by Wolchik and Curry (2015) in their volume on the Eastern European transition to
democracy, social aspects of transformation with associated social pathologies are an important part
of system change, often poisoning the political discussions of a country. Social aspects and social
pathologies include alcoholism, juvenile delinquency, prostitution, violence in the home, drug use
and  street  crime,  organized  crime,  human  trafficking,  smuggling,  sex  trade,  tensions  between
various ethnic groups, discrimination and marginalization of minorities (Wolchik and Curry 2015,
p. 30), not to mention an increase in state-organized crime relations. In the specific case of Iraq, the
social  costs  of war with associated war amenities must also be added, as these have important
repercussions on the socio-structural transformations in employment relations, in the availability of
funds for security, also leading to an increase in terrorism and suicidal bombings.
To  provide  a  brief  picture  of  the  main  socio-economic  transformations,  since  the  1960s,  Iraq
witnessed an exponential growth of the population. This was caused by the economic expansion
following the increase in oil prices resulting from the OPEC decision of the 1970s (World Bank
Development Indicators 2015). The subsequent sudden rise in revenues and in welfare significantly
changed  the  lifestyle  and  political  aspirations  for  liberty  of  many  Iraqis.  This  included  the
materialization of a baby-boom, as it happened in Western Europe during the golden age of the
welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 2001), with an exponential rise in the number of new
births.  Changes  in  political  orientation  towards  an  increase  in  post-materialist  values  and  the
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secularization of the society, as aptly described by Inglehart (1990), have also materialized, though
to a lower extent than in Western post-industrial societies. As a result of these societal changes, the
percentage of the urban population rapidly increased, from approximately 40 percent of the total
population in the 1960s to 70 percent at  the end of 2012 (World Bank Development Indicators
2015).
Though comparable long-term labor market statistics for the same period are not available, in the
1990s  Iraq  witnessed  a  slow  growth  in  employment.  Important  to  note  here  is  that,  despite
significant  improvements,  access  to  labor  market  remains  predominantly male-dominated,  with
particularly high percentages of youth unemployment and especially among young women. A recent
report of the IBRD/World Bank (2014, pp. 90-94), based on a seven day recall period, has shown
that  the  almost  totality  of  women  (approximately  90  percent)  are  not  in  the  labor  force.  The
remaining  10  percent  is  employed  in  part-time  jobs.  Changes  from  part-time  to  full-time
employment are observable for men. Employment, especially for men, is the highest in the central
governorates  of  the  country  and  has  increased  between  2007  and  2012  in  Kurdistan  and  the
Northern regions as well, where it has reached the national average of 70 percent. The southern
governorates have witnessed, instead, a decrease in men employment (IBRD/World Bank 2014, pp.
94-95)6.
Increasing poverty has been a clear outcome of the various civil conflicts, ethnic tensions and wars
that  have  characterized  the  country  since  the  advent  of  Saddam Hussein  with  his  contentious
politics (Tilly 2007) of discrimination and assassinations of political opponents and minorities. The
al-Anfal Campaign against the Kurds conducted between 1986-1989 (or Kurdish genocide) is only
one notable example of the crimes against humanity committed by the Saddam regime. The wars
that followed, both for oil-related reasons, as well as for reasons concerned with the responsibility
of the international community to protect against such massacres, as expressed in the Report of the
6Employment rates for women are substantially lower and range from 13 percent in Kurdistan to 9
percent in the North and the South (IBRD/World Bank 2014, pp. 94-95).
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International  Commission  on  Intervention  and  State  Sovereignty  (2001)  (see  also  Merkel  and
Grimm 2009),  did  not  yet  succeed  to  put  an  end  to  pre-existing  socio-structural  problems  of
development. Between 2007 and 2012, years where the first comparable statistics are available, the
poverty headcount ratio at US$ 2 a day slightly changed from 22 to 21 percent of the population
(World Bank Development Indicators 2015). In terms of regional divisions, in 2012, 58 percent of
Iraq’s poor lived in five governorates (Baghdad7, Basra, Nineveh, Babylon and Thi-Qar), compared
to 40 percent in 2007 (Word Bank 2014, p.19). Interestingly, the highest poverty rates have been
found among  households  headed  by women,  unemployed,  part-time  workers,  employed  in  the
agricultural and fishing sector and construction. The lowest poverty rates among people employed
in public administration and services and utilities. Here, it is important to note that the average wage
in Iraq corresponds to $642 and the system is based on the male breadwinner model, which means
that only men work in the household (World Bank 2014, p. 32). Taking into account the fact that a
three bed room apartment outside the center of Bagdad costs $643 and one kilo of white rice $1.76,
it becomes immediately evident that no single worker is able to feed his family with one single
salary.
Important to note is that the United Nations economic sanctions have changed the traditional diet of
Iraqis, lowering the availability of foods. Whilst the traditional diet of Iraqis included rice with soup
or sauce, accompanied by lamb, fish and vegetables, today, because of food rations, because of the
amenities  of war people started to eat rice or another  grain sometimes with sauce.  The rations
provided are estimated to last twenty to twenty-three days and include flour, tea, sugar, rice, beans,
milk, cooking oil, soap, and salt8. What should be remembered is that Iraq needs to import a large
quantity of food in order to feed its population. Oil-led economic growth helps to provide additional
7Please note that according to the IBRD/World Bank (2014, p. 34) report, households in Baghdad
need a minimum income that is on average 40 percent higher than the Baghdad poverty line.
8See  Countries  and  Their  Culture  2015. http://www.everyculture.com/Ge-
It/Iraq.html#ixzz3S6WDx9Gb
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funding for imports and for price subsidies to basic goods, but it does not resolve the problem (FAO
2014).
In the case of Iraq, the existence of serious war related human development problems is associated
with  ever  increasing  vertical  and  horizontal  inequalities  -  that  is,  inequalities  existing  among
individuals and households and inequalities existing among social groups (ethnic, religious, etc.)
(see Stewart  2008; Langer  et  al 2011).  The unresolved territorial  and ethnic disputes  make the
problem of the simultaneous transition to a democratic system based on market economic principles
even more difficult (see Offe 1991). 
To clarify, for Stewart (2008) and Langer  et al (2011), vertical  inequalities refer to the disparities
that emerge among individuals and households in a determined society, while horizontal inequalities
refer to the differences that materialize among the different social groups (ethnic, religious, etc.). In
terms  of  vertical  inequalities,  through  several  de-commodification,  stratification  and  de-
clientelization strategies, welfare regimes are able to alter the dominant social positions among the
members  of  a society.  As a  consequence of  a  differentiated access to  welfare programs,  social
distances among individuals can, in this way, be reduced or enlarged through differential forms of
social integration. In terms of horizontal inequalities, and due to the clientelistic approach to social
protection in force in Iraq, welfare regimes have also the power to create important new social
divides between the members of different communities belonging to the same nation. Members of
an ethnic group, tribe or clan can, for example, be privileged by the dominant leaders through a
preferential  access to the labour market or social  services and this  has the potential  to increase
tensions and social conflicts, which, in turn, through mechanisms led by revenge or anger, may lead
to  system  instability.  In  formerly  ISIS-occupied  territories  the  presence  of  new  vertical  and
horizontal inequalities is an issue that must be addressed. It is perhaps not a case that ISIS-leaders
are increasingly playing this card to obtain social acceptance.
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Cultural Change in Iraq
Civilization in Iraq dates back to ancient Mesopotamia, whose traditions influence contemporary
national pride and national identity. Contrary to most countries in the Arab world, in Iraq, Sunnis
are a minority, whilst Shias represent the majority of the population. Before the US intervention,
Iraq had a central planned economy and, as a legacy of the past, it is still common to access jobs
through clientelistic relations in the government9. As a state-building objective, Saddam Hussein
once  stated  that  an  educated  and  liberated  mother  is  one  who  will  give  back  to  the  country
conscious and committed fighters for Iraq10.  This understanding of family planning is,  to some
extent, still in place11.
Recognizing  the  importance  of  the  tribal  structure  is  key  for  understanding  the  Iraqi  modern
civilization. Throughout the turmoil that have materialized in the country over the centuries, the
tribe has always remained the most important social entity. In absence of strong central authority
and an accountable bureaucracy (Weber [1922]1968), tribes have played the important function of
“quasi-polities”  whose  leaders  (known as sheikhs) have  administered  resources,  social  services,
managed emerging social and ethnic conflicts, as well as providing law enforcement capabilities. In
order to create an alternative, complementary but still loyal power structure, the Saddam Hussein
regime reinforced the  functions  of  tribes  as  vital  socio-political  sub-units,  re-establishing  tribal
councils and putting them under direct control of mostly Sunni sheikhs12.
Sunni tribes are particularly present in central and western Iraq, whilst Shiite tribes in the North.
Kurdish tribes are, instead, predominant in the northern part of the country and, more specifically,
9According to the Arab Barometer for Iraq (2012, p.52) approximately 65 percent of the population
state that ‘obtaining employment through connections is extremely widespread’.
10See  Countries  and  Their  Culture  2015. http://www.everyculture.com/Ge-
It/Iraq.html#ixzz3S6WDx9Gb
11According to the Arab Barometer for Iraq (2012, pp. 28-29), ‘over 75 percent agree that men are
better than women at political leadership’, whilst approximately ‘25 percent of respondents believe
that university education is more important for men than it is for women’.
12See  Countries  and  Their  Culture  2015. http://www.everyculture.com/Ge-
It/Iraq.html#ixzz3S6WDx9Gb
15
in Kurdistan. Recent estimations show that at least 75 percent of the Iraqi population belong to one
of the country’s 150 tribes13. Power relations in the tribes’ social structure remain feudalistic and
characterized by a strong hierarchy between members. These represent the basis for clientelistic do
ut  des bargaining,  often  exacerbating  already  existing  sectarian  divides  (eg.  Sunni  vs.  Shia
dominated tribes) (Khan 2007). In this tribal-oriented society, individuals are protected, but their
rights  and  autonomy are  limited  by  the  sheikhs  and  by the  other  members  of  the  tribe.  This
particularly applies to women and children, who, as members of the family, do not have much right
to choose about their own future14. The ‘politics of revenge’ is a particular important aspect of Iraqi
clans and tribes (see Hames 2017). For clan and tribe members, seeking revenge is seen as a crucial
and compulsory act for the maintenance of power and status. Every insult or affront must, in some
way, be avenged (see also Eisenstadt 2007).
The importance of ISIS in changing cultural patterns in Iraq must be emphasized. It involves, for
example, not only a radicalization and over-de-secularization of society, but also de-modernization.
The increasing number of women who joined the organization as fighters (and, in case, martyrs)
and built  a new family (Saltman and Smith 2015) represents here a notable example of a new
societal structure in the making, with associated emerging social order. This has a price. According
to Fatf (2015, p. 13), ISIS fighters paying for a female slave approximately $13. In 2017, the price
has increased between $35 or $50 (Jones et al. 2017, p. 11).
The Social Security System in Iraq
In Iraq, the formal social security system is based on the social insurance principle and depends on
the attachment of citizens to the labor market or, when not accessible, on informal social security
arrangements provided by the members of the family or the tribe. Due to the oil-based orientation of
13See  Countries  and  Their  Culture  2015. http://www.everyculture.com/Ge-
It/Iraq.html#ixzz3S6WDx9Gb
14See GlobalSecurity.org 2005. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm
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the economy, public sector employees represent a larger part of the insured persons. In order to
protect uncovered citizens, the government has established a  Public Distribution System based on
state-sponsored fuel subsidies and rations. The implications of this system are, first of all,  high
dependence from state-owned enterprises and state-driven labor market performance with a residual
neo-liberal  coverage  for  the  non-employed,  and,  second,  to  food  rations  distributed  to
approximately 99 percent of the population (El Mekkaoui de Freitas and Johnson 2012, p.9). The
fiscal  space  for  such  policies,  therefore,  greatly  depends  on  oil  revenues  and  state-budget
availability of funds.
With  regard  to  pensions,  these  rely on  the  social  insurance  principle,  which  implies  that  only
workers  in  formal  employment  have  access  to  retirement.  Self-employed  persons,  agricultural
employees, temporary employees, household workers, and family labor are excluded from pension
entitlements. This situation becomes particularly worrying in the case of disability and survivor
pensions, especially in a war-setting environment. The public distribution system is set to cover this
deficit, but, as mentioned, it is often subjected to a lack of funds due to the drop in oil prices.
Similarly,  access to health care is  based on health  insurance contributions.  This implies that  in
absence  of  state-sponsored  provisions  only  employed  persons  have  access  to  full  coverage.
Important to note is that the subsequent wars in Iraq have destroyed most of the health facilities and
this  has,  subsequently,  resulted  in  a  lack  of  infrastructures,  medical  equipment,  personnel  and
medicines.  As a report  by UNOCHA (2015, p.2) has shown, approximately 20 per cent of the
population (7 million people) cannot access even the most basic health care services, with women
and  children  particularly  vulnerable  to  poverty  related  diseases,  forced  marriage  and  sexual
violence.  The  public  health  emergency  in  Iraq  requires  the  reestablishment  of  basic  medical
services, especially in those areas controlled by armed groups where about 50 percent of health
professionals have fled15.
15http://www.save-iraq.info/download/205/ 
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With  regard  to  protection  against  unemployment,  jobs  are  mostly  provided  by  the  state,
unemployment insurance covers only a small part of the population. Usually, this involves those
citizens who have worked in state owned enterprises and are attached to national and local political
elites. Interesting to note is that employment protection law dates back to 1964 (with subsequent
amendments) and, therefore, it has been established in a period antecedent to Saddam Hussein’s rise
to power. It is based on the social assistance principle, though highly residual in scope and coverage
(US Social Security Administration 2014).
Finally, maternity and family benefits are also based on the social insurance principle and, thus,
covering only a very small part of Iraqi women. In absence of full and decent employment, women
continue to be seen as wives-mothers rather than active participants in the labor market. This is also,
to some extent, represented in the attitudes of the Iraqi population toward women. According to the
Arab Barometer for Iraq (2012, p.28), approximately 72 percent of respondents state that ‘men and
women should have equal work opportunities’.
The Social Security System in Formerly ISIS Occupied Territories
Drawing  on  Charles  Tilly’s  (1985)  seminal  work  entitled War  Making  and  State  Making  as
Organized  Crime,  it  is  possible  to  affirm  that  the  functions  that  several  rebel  and  terrorist
organizations linked to ISIS carry out in their everyday lives (in particular, protective, extractive,
and redistributive) are equivalent to those of a state and, therefore, turn the organization or the rebel
group into something more than a simple loose confederation of organized ‘self-made’ criminals. It
is  not  by  chance  that  their  members,  once  emotionally  and  institutionally  affiliated  to  the
organization, have started to: (1) carry out ‘intelligence’ activities typical of a state, such as those
linked to searching and punishing possible spies within the territory under their control; (2) tax for
the passage from one city to another city of any illicit contraband (e.g. drugs, weapons, laundered
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cash and people)16; (3) collect profits, and protect and control the production areas; (4) recruit and
provide subsistence to the marginalized peoples living in underdeveloped regions; and (5) deliver a
range of social services to the population in need (see also Sanger and Davis 2014). 
In this process of nation-state building, rentierism has becomes a complementary mechanism of
state formation made possible by the acquisition and redistribution of natural resources. This nation-
building process also requires a system of propaganda that occurs mostly through social networks
(Khatib 2015), as well as the construction of a Weberian bureaucratic structure, necessary to ensure
the state fiscal capacity to reduce a ‘state failure’ and state collapse. In this context, the creation of
an ISIS organized rentier state represents a further impediment to the process of democratization in
Iraq,  as  it  aligns  socio-political  norms  to  the  patrimonial  nature  of  social  interactions  with
associated religiously dominated loyalties (Thies 2015). In fact, as argued by Schwarz (2011, p.
427) for the Saddam era,  “the massive influx of oil  revenues during the 1970s enabled Iraq to
pursue  a  policy of  ‘guns and butter’ –  extravagant  spending on expanding its  military-security
machinery and on welfare benefits […] [which allowed] the regime to embark on a state-making
project  based  on  large-scale  spending  implemented  in  a  top–down fashion  and  divorced  from
societal demands. These benefits mainly came in the form of state-provided jobs”.
In order to increase its acceptance among the population, ISIS has also invested in infrastructures
(such as building underground pipelines, employing engineers, etc.), in social services and social
benefits. It has also made regular payments to the families of members killed or captured, purchases
of diesel  generators for distributing electricity,  and mobilizes existing infrastructures to  provide
basic services, or engaging in agricultural production and taxation (FATF 2015, pp. 29-30)17. In
16 In 2016, ISIS taxation rates in Iraq and Syria range, in the agricultural sector, to $46 per irrigated
hectare of land per year and 10 percent of wheat crop produced and their sale at the local market.
There is also a tax on Jizya tax on non-Sunnis equivalent to $2,500 for delivering a certificate for
Shiite or non-Muslim and $800 fee in order to leave the city in Raqqah. In addition, there is also
$43 tax for an official Islamic State license plate, $23 per woman with a pack of cigarettes and a
$10 per woman who shows her eyes (Robinson et al. 2017, Table 2.1, p. 12). 
17According to  Fatf  (2015,  p.  30),  ‘energy experts  estimate  that  ISIS can  rebuild  a  single  oil
refinery in 10 days for 230,000 USD’.
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formerly  ISIS-controlled  territories,  the  largest  expenditures  in  salaries  estimated  (between  $3
million and $10 million every month) are, however, employed for ISIS police-state institutions,
such as committees, media, courts, and market regulation and thus ensuring Tilly’s security function
(see Almukhtar 2015).
As a consequence, in order to de-radicalize extremists, the importance of timing and sequencing of
reforms  (Pierson  2004)  in  the  implementation  of  public  policy  instruments  must  not  be
underestimated.  Whilst  guaranteeing security is an urgent and unavoidable necessity in order to
make development, social security and democratization related projects really work, recalibrating
and  rescaling  policy-making  (Kazepov  2010;  Stubbs  and  Zrinščak  2009)  towards  non  ISIS-
affiliated  tribes  represents  an  additional  important  element  to  take  into  account  in  system
transformation. It affects positively the restructuring of spatial politics through the creation of new
political boundaries (Bartolini 2005), as well as new boundaries of responsibilities (Ferrera 2005).
This would necessitate the creation of new steering mechanisms (Mayntz 2003) and structures of
more adaptive multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001), shifting responsibilities from ISIS
to non-ISIS affiliated actors. In order to resolve the issue of a failing federalism, as discussed by
Haggard and Long (2007), the creation of a system of multilevel governance, in which ‘local states’
interact among each other to ensure that national human development objectives are effectively
implemented, would be needed.
Democratization: Liberalization, Institutionalization and Consolidation
A correct  understanding  of  the  facilitators  of  democratization  becomes  particularly  important,
especially in the presence of state fragility where conflict, poor development status, vulnerability to
endogenous and exogenous threats, and the lack of a developmental state capable of addressing the
emerging socio-economic problems in a consistent way are the key characteristics. 
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According to O'Donnel and Schmitter (1986), democratization, as a process, can be operationalized
in three phases:  liberalization,  institutionalization and consolidation.  Liberalization refers to  the
liberalization  of  the  political  regime and to  the  promotion  of  the  associated  political  and civil
liberties.  Institutionalization  implies  the  institutionalization  of  norms  and  practices,  so  that
democracy  becomes  ‘the  only  game  in  town’ (Przeworski  1991,  p.26).  Consolidation  denotes,
instead,  the consolidation of democratic  institutional  and cultural  repertoires.  These include the
consolidation  of  the  constitution,  the  consolidation  of  the  system  of  interest  and  political
representation, the consolidation of the democratic behavior and the consolidation of civic culture
and civic society (Almond and Verba 1963; Merkel 2010, p.105).
In this context, the costs associated with the existence of ‘fragile’ states are enormous and can affect
the economic development and system stabilization possibilities of the countries for several years to
come  (Naudé et  al. 2011).  Despite  the  persistence  of  some  shortcomings,  aid  for  democracy-
enhancing projects continues to represent the most important element in democracy promotion and
consolidation. However, while external democracy aid remains among the most important element
in democracy promotion, it would be false to state that it is the only possible means. Here, it is also
important to better understand and carefully examine the consequences of democracy. In fact, the
evaluation of democracy by citizens is far from an irrelevant factor in system stability and change
because it is a strong determinant in forecasting the durability of democracy (Bermeo 2009) in one
country, as well as influencing future stages and waves of democratization. So far, the focus of
experts has been on the positive consequences of democratization  (Kapstein and Converse 2008;
Houle 2009). But little attention has been given to the possible roll-back to authoritarianism and de-
modernization (Diamond 2008). The “co-evolution” of these complex ecosystems, including their
synergies and processes of variation, selection and replication in politics, polity and policy settings,
for  making  Iraq  democracy  work  (Putnam  2000)  and  more  resilient  has  been  far  too  often
underestimated.
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Conclusion
As a ‘total social phenomenon’ in the sense of Marcel Mauss (2000), ISIS can be described as an
economical, juridical, moral, religious, mythological and esthetical multidimensional phenomenon
that must be better understood and defeated. Linked to new ISIS counter-terrorist financing and
more effective de-radicalization strategies, changes in the public policy administration domain must
be implemented in order to reduce the negative emerging distributive and redistributive conflicts
(Haggard  and  Kaufman  2016).  These  policy  choices  should  include  a  redefinition  of  the
main economical, juridical, moral, religious, mythological and esthetical forms and countours of
radicalized Islam.
As an important ecosystem (à la Parsons 1951 and Luhmann 1984), the Iraqi labor market has been
used as a means to ensure political loyalty (see Hirschman 1978). Its de-ISISization (not necessarily
through military intervention)  and democratization is  needed.  In  Iraq,  following the fall  of  the
Saddam regime, and due to poor public administration capacity, the governance architecture of the
welfare regime has remained highly underdeveloped and decentralized. Access to social services
and distribution of welfare benefits has depended, for the most part,  on non-state and religious
actors (see Benthall and Bellion- Jourdan 2003; Gellner 1981). Tasks are now carried out by ISIS
members.  By shifting the responsibilities some tasks to non-ISIS linked religious and other non-
state actors (such as clans and tribes), the pressures caused by the state inefficiencies in public
administration can be reduced, though adequate public policy instruments (Lascoumes and Le Galès
2007) must be found. In this way, the religious attachment of the population can be maintained,
whilst democratizing the system of political, economic, cultural and social governance. Increasing
participation of non-ISIS-linked non-state actors becomes, in this context, crucial to increase input
and output legitimacy (Willets 2006; Cammet and MacLean 2014; Nasiritousi et al. 2015; see also
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Acemoglu  and Robinson 2012). New public  policy instruments  to  de-radicalize  ISIS  non-state
actors must be found.
What  Complexity  Theory adds to  the  understanding  of  Iraq  future  patterns  of  democratic
stabilization  and  consolidation  here  is  its  main  focus  on soft  technologies  (public  policy  and
political economy methods, including those methods linked to abrupt versus gradual institutional
change, path-dependent versus path-breaking, or inclusive versus exclusive public policies) instead
on simply hard technologies (such as only through military interventions and weapons). These soft
and hard technologies are useful to block ISIS' caliphate-building activities, including processes of
economic, political, cultural and social change (Room et al. 2017). As mentioned, the NUDGES
approach has focused on iNcentives, Understand mappings, Defaults, Give feedback, Expect error,
and Structure complex choices for making public policy decisions. Instead, the Nuzzle approach
proposed by Room et al. (2017) also pays attention to the “citizens' formal organizations, as well as
their more informal communities (including religious, cultural, residential, etc.) around which Iraqis
and Kurdish identities are built. As a multi-dimensional eco-system, studying ISIS in its political,
economic,  social  and cultural  evolution becomes a necessary endeavour,  as necessary is having
clearly in mind its evolution, including processes of variation, as well as the associated mechanisms
of selection and replication of institutions and social practices (Lewis and Steinmo 2012, p. 314).
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